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ABSTRACT
There is debate about the value of using devil's advocates in stra-
tegic decision-making. In this paper, contrasting views on this
question are summarized and the field and laboratory research on the
devil's advocate are discussed. This research provides the basis for
detailed suggestions on the effective use of devil's advocates in stra-
tegic decisions.

INTRODUCTION
* President Kennedy, fresh from a stinging defeat in the Bay of
Pigs fiasco, appoints his brother Robert and Theodore Sorenson to play
the role of devil's advocate and critically examine alternative American
responses to the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba suggested by the
president's advisory staff. The quality of decision-making improves
dramatically during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the U.S. chooses an
effective response to the Soviet threat.
* President Johnson, during one of the decisions to escalate the
bombing in North Viet Nam in the mid-1960' s asks dissenter George Ball
to play the role of devil's advocate and clearly articulate his objec-
tions to the bombing before Johnson's top advisors. However, Ball's
arguments and those of other dissident staff members fail to deter
Johnson from the eventually disastrous course he has chosen. Johnson's
confidence in this course of action is actually increased because he
has "heard both sides" of the question.
Decision-makers in business and government often use informal
dissenters or devil's advocates to check their assumptions in complex
decisions. However, as the above examples of presidential decision-
making suggest, organizational devil's advocates do not always prevent
major decisional errors. Indeed, they may even help to solidify com-
mitment to a disastrous course of action by giving the decision-makers
confidence that they considered all points of view and arrived at the
decision rationally and objectively. Why are devil's advocates effec-
tive in some situations and not others? Recently, researchers have
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begun to explore the reasons for these differences in the impact of
devil's advocacy. Based on their research, it is now possible to offer
guidelines for improving the effectiveness of devil's advocates in stra-
tegic decision-making.
This paper begins with a discussion of the reasons devil's advocates
may be needed. Next, three major forms of devil's advocacy are discussed,
Finally, suggestions are offered for the effective use of devil's advo-
cates in strategic decision-making.
THE NEED FOR DEVIL'S ADVOCACY
Organizational strategy formulation is a task of immense complexity.
It requires interpreting ambiguous cues from the environment, assessing
the organization's resources and capacities, and the generation of
effective strategies for matching the organization's resources to the
demands of the environment. The complexity of the task and the sheer
volume of data involved can easily exceed executives' information pro-
cessing capacity (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1976).
However, experienced executives learn to simplify this task by
making assumptions about their strategic problems. Mason and Mitroff,
in Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions (1981), discuss the ways
these assumptions restrict the strategies considered for dealing with
the problems. Such simplifying assumptions are necessary for making
the task of strategy formulation manageable. Indeed, it may be that
the ability to make valid simplifying assumptions distinguishes good
strategists from mediocre ones.
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Problems may arise, however, when these assumptions are not chal-
lenged in strategy formulation. When very cohesive groups of executives
share a large number of assumptions about the strategic problem, this
may produce blind spots or biases. These biases may lead them to ignore
environmental opportunities and threats as well as creative strategic
alternatives. Irving Janis (1972), and Janis and Mann (1977) discuss
the phenomenon of groupthink which is a pathological inability to
question assumptions created by excessive consensus and pressure for
conformity.
Recognizing that groupthink can aggravate biases in decision-making,
Janis and Mann recommend the use of devil's advocates who attempt to
counteract it. Many executives, recognizing the biases which may be
produced by simplifying assumptions, make use of informal devil's advo-
cates to challenge them. A review of the business and public administra-
tion literatures has revealed three major approaches to devil's advocacy,
which will be discussed next.
Three Types of Devil's Advocacy
Three types of devil's advocacy have been discussed in the business
and public administration literatures. The first is the basic devil's
advocate approach in which a person within a decision-making group is
appointed to critique a preferred plan or option. This person attempts
to point out weaknesses in the assumptions underlying the plan, its
internal inconsistencies, and problems which may lead to failure in
implementation.
Devil's advocacy was first used by the Catholic Church in the 1600 's
as part of the process of canonization of saints. The Devil's Advocate,
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or Promoter of the Faith was charged with presenting the strongest
possible case against canonization to a Tribunal of the Congregation
of Rites (a permanent commission of cardinals) with the pope as supreme
judge. The Devil's Advocate was considered crucial in preventing Church
leaders from making an error in this critically important decision
(Herbert and Estes, 1977, 663-664).
Janis (1972) and Janis and Mann (1977) in recommending the use of
devil's advocates by policy makers, use Robert F. Kennedy's role in the
Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of its successful use. They suggest
that in situations in which there is a great deal of agreement among
policy-makers and there is danger of premature concensus, the chief
executive should assign one or more group members to the role of
devil's advocate. This person should "be given an unambiguous assign-
ment to present his arguments as cleverly and convincingly as he can,
like a good lawyer, challenging the testimony of those advocating the
majority position." Janis suggests that this person should introduce
much-needed controversy by raising issues in a conventional low-key
style (1972, p. 215).
Herbert and Estes (1977) discussed the use of devil's advocates as a
way of formalizing dissent in the strategy formulation process. They
suggested that an individual, either within or outside the organiza-
tion, should be appointed to the position of devil's advocate for every
major organizational decision. The devil's advocate should begin with
the formal statement of a proposed course of action and the analysis
underlying the proposal. He should then examine the proposal for
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and irrelevancies and prepare a critique
of the proposal based on this examination. If the proposal is found to
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be unsound, the devil's advocate should develop a reanalysis of the
problem and alternative recommendations. A kind of confrontation ses-
sion between an advocate of the original proposal and the devil's ad-
vocate is then held with key organizational decision-makers as observers,
Based on this confrontation session the organizational decision-makers
can then accept the proposal, modify it, or develop a completely new
proposal based on a more complete understanding of the proposal's
shortcomings.
Cosier (1981, p. 647) developed a model of the devil's advocate
critique process which involved the identification of assumptions
underlying a recommended strategy, the development of a critique of
these assumptions, the production of an alternative strategy based on
this critique, and the choice of a final strategy after a debate be-
tween the proponents of the recommended strategy and the critique.
Cosier 's model was primarily meant to apply to business decision-
making.
A variant of this basic devil's advocate approach is called
multiple advocacy (George, 1972). This technique involves the use of
several devil's advocates drawn from the organization's internal or
external critics. Each group critical of a preferred option or plan
can be represented by their own devil's advocate. Alexander George, in
his book Presidential Decision-Making
,
claims that multiple advocacy
should be superior to the use of devil's advocates because it includes
more advocates and more options. In the multiple advocacy system,
representatives of minority opinions and unpopular views present these
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to decision-makers in order to encourage them to question the assump-
tions underlying the prevailing or favored policy.
A key role in this process is that of the custodian of unpopular
views. The custodian attempts to assure:
1) that there is no major maldistribution of resources among the
proponents of various views. (Important resources include: power,
influence, competence, information, analytical resources, and bargain-
ing and persuasion skills).
2) that there is no involvement by the top-level decision-maker(s)
in the debate.
3) that there is adequate time for give and take (George, 1972, p.
759).
The decision-makers who listen to these devil's advocates should
play the role of a "magistrate," attempting to listen objectively to
all devil's advocate critiques. Even through complete objectivity is
unlikely, the use of this technique assures that managers will at least
be aware of potential objections which may hinder implementation of a
plan.
Mason and Mitroff (1981) have summarized research on another variant
of devil's advocacy. They call this technique dialectical inquiry and
in its elaborated form, Strategic Assumptions Analysis. Dialectical
inquiry includes techniques for choosing individuals to form groups
which will produce the most divergent solutions to strategic problems.
These techniques involve first the assessment of the personality and
problem-solving orientation of each person in the decision-making group.
Decision-makers are then clustered into groups which are maximally
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homogeneous and also maximally different from each other. The groups
then develop alternatives to a recommended strategy or plan by iden-
tifying assumptions upon which it is based and upon which the group
members do not agree. If groups with conflicting policy preferences
already exist, as is often the case, these may be used and it is not
necessary to use the procedure for forming divergent groups.
Dialectical inquiry requires the development of explicit counter-
plans based on different assumptions than the favored plan as the basis
for a dialectical debate. However, a devil's advocate does not have to
develop an explicit counterplan. If a favored strategy has been iden-
tified early in the decision-making process, the techniques for con-
structing divergent groups and identifying pivotal assumptions could be
used as a basis for constructing a critique which merely challenges the
key assumptions but offers no alternative plan.
Both simple devil's advocacy and dialectical inquiry are, according
to Mason (1969), distinctly superior to what he calls the expert
approach which is seen as the most common approach to top management
decision-making. In this approach, members of a planning department or
consultants provide expert advice and recommendations regarding the
plans the organization should follow. Mason suggests that the planning
recommendations contain hidden assumptions which are very frequently
not communicated to management, but which may reinforce management
biases. This is one of the most critical drawbacks to this approach
(1969, pp. B406-B407).
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the differences between the
techniques.
Insert Table 1 about here
RESEARCH ON DEVIL'S ADVOCACY
Researchers have examined the effects of these types of devil's
advocacy in published accounts of major decisions (Schwenk and Huff,
forthcoming); they have used the dialectical inquiry variant of devil's
advocacy in assisting or improving strategic decisions (Mason, 1969;
Mitroff, Barabba, and Kilmann, 1977; Erashoff and Finnel, 1978; Mitroff,
Emshoff, and Kilmann, 1979); and they have examined the effectiveness
of alternative forms of devil's advocacy in the controlled setting of
the laboratory (Cosier, 1980; Schwenk, 1982; Schwenk, forthcoming;
Schwenk and Cosier, 1980; Schwenk and Thomas, 1983). Though this
research has raised many questions and left many others unanswered, it
does provide the basis for some tentative recommendations on the way
the devil's advocate role should be played and the way devil's advocates
should be used in top-level strategic decision-making.
The research generally supports the assertion that the use of a
devil's advocate can improve organizational decisions in a number of
ways. Specifically, it improves decision-makers' satisfaction with the
process (Mason, 1969; Mason and Mitroff, 1979; Mitroff et al
.
, 1977;
Schwenk, forthcoming), it leads to the explicit identification of pre-
viously unrecognized assumptions (Mason, 1969; Mason and Mitroff, 1979;
Mitroff et al., 1977), it improves decision-makers' use of ambiguous
environmental cues in decision-making (Cosier, 1980; Schwenk, 1982;
Schwenk and Cosier, 1980), it increases the number and quality of stra-
tegic alternatives generated (Mitroff et al., 1977; Mitroff et al.,
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1979; Schwenk, forthcoming), it expands decision-makers' view of the
problem and weakens the narrowing influence of expert recommendations
(Mason, 1969; Schwenk, forthcoming).
SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR THE USE OF DEVIL'S ADVOCACY
Even if decision-makers are able to look critically at their as-
sumptions, they may not receive the full benefit of the technique if
the devil's advocate does not play the role effectively. Below are
some suggestions derived from the research for using devil's advocacy
effectively. Caution must be exercised in drawing normative recommen-
dations from the research. However, with this caution in mind, some
tentative rules can be advanced.
1.) The specific role of the devil's advocate should vary depend-
ing on the type of decision. Here, two basic types of decisions are
considered, those in which there is a great deal of pre-existing
conflict between members of the policy-making group and those where
there is very little.
A.) When there is a great deal of conflict present initially in
the group, and when group members are advocating different positions,
the devil's advocate should be active throughout the decision-making
process (Janis, 1972; Janis & Mann, 1977; de Rivera, 1968). He should
attempt to articulate and clarify the differences in assumptions which
underlie the differences in recommendations as did the consultants in
a Mitroff et al. study involving a drug company (Mitroff et al., 1979).
The devil's advocate in this situation may also be required to play
a role similar to that of George's "custodian" to ensure that each
group is assisted in developing its case. A structured debate should
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then occur in which each group is allowed to present its case with
rebuttal from other groups and questions from those who have final
responsibility for making the decision. Studies (Mitroff et al., 1977
and Mitroff et al., 1979) have shown that this is effective in clarify-
ing assumptions. If the group must reach concensus, it may be necessary
to go through an assumption negotiation stage (Mason & Mitroff, 1981,
p. 52). If concensus is not required, those with final responsibility
for the decision should play a role similar to George's "magistrate" in
order to avoid becoming prematurely committed to one position.
B.) If the decision-making process is characterized by too little
conflict and a preferred alternative has been identified with too little
questioning of assumptions, the devil's advocate should play a different
role (Herbert & Estes, 1977; Jervis, 1968 & 1976). Here, the devil's
advocate will attempt to initiate assumption questioning and problem
reformulation by identifying critical assumptions and using these as
the basis for a forcefully presented critique which does not offer a
clearly defined alternative. Some of the laboratory research (Cosier,
1980; Schwenk, 1982a), Schwenk and Cosier, 1980) seems to suggest that
this will be more effective than the development of a specific counter-
plan. However, it may be, as the proponents of the field studies spe-
culate, that with adequate training or indoctrination of decision-
makers the plan-counterplan format may be even more effective than the
plancritique format. This has not yet been verified. Finally, if the
devil's advocate has the time and resources to develop them, both a
critique and counterplan may be more effective than either alone
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(Schwenk, 1982), though Schwenk's research did not show that the com-
bination was more effective than the critique alone.
2.) The devil's advocate should avoid strongly identifying with a
particular position and becoming a strongly negative "carping critic."
Mason (1969) warned against this as a potential problem with the DA.
He also suggested that this sort of devil's advocate may "demoralize"
decision makers and especially those who proposed the initial plan.
Rather, the devil's advocate should play the role of a process con-
sultant interested only in surfacing assumptions and improving decision-
making. Schwenk and Cosier (1980) showed that a "carping critic" form
of the DA treatment did not lead to better use of environmental cues
than the treatment but that a more objective DA treatment did.
In this sense, the models of the debate process, the philosophical
concepts which justify these models, and the detailed techniques for
managing debate offered by Mitroff and his colleagues (Mason and
Mitroff, 1981; Mitroff and Mason, 1981; Cosier, 1980) may be of value
to devil's advocates. They may help to legitimize his role as an ex-
pert process consultant.
3.) Finally, there is some question about whether a single person
should play the role of devil's advocate for a series of decisions or
whether this role should rotate among group members. The research has
not yet addressed this question. If a single individual plays this
role over a series of decisions he should, through practice, become a
more effective devil's advocate. On the other hand, rotation of the
role may give the entire group a clearer understanding of the DA pro-
cess and prevent the negative consequences which might result from the
identification of a single individual as "the devil's advocate."
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If a single individual adopts Che role, he should attempt to iden-
tify another individual in the group who's views on the decision in
question diverge from the rest of the group to assist him in preparing
the critique. If the role shifts to a different person for each de-
cision, the person selected to play the devil's advocate in a particu-
lar case should have the maximum divergence of assumptions from other
group members. Mason and Mitroff (1981, pp. 114-119) have described
techniques which could be helpful in this selection.
CONCLUSION
The use of devil's advocates does not guarantee increased par-
ticipation in the strategic decision-making process and will generally
not produce major shifts in policy. Further, devil's advocates may not
be able to prevent major strategic errors. However, the research dis-
cussed in this paper demonstrates that their use can improve strategic
decision making if certain rules are followed.
Briefly stated, the devil's advocate should play the role of pro-
cess consultant and/or objective critic of a favored strategy rather
than a "carping critic" identified with a particular alternative strat-
egy. The point at which the devil's advocate intervenes and the spe-
cific role he plays should be determined by the level of conflict over
a particular issue in the decision-making group.
The one major caution regarding the use of devil's advocates has to
do with the attitudes of those in the decision-making group. Devil's
advocates should only be used if decision-makers can honestly question
their basic assumptions and have a sincere commitment to the devil's
advocate process. Without such commitment, the use of devil's advocates
may be useless or even harmful.
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Table 1
Variants on Devil's Advocacy
Technique
Devil's
Advocacy
Features
Usually single
individual plays
Devil's Advocate.
Broad mandate to
critique favored
plan.
Further
Information
Irving Janis & Leon Mann
Decis ion-Making
Multiple
Advocacy
Dialectical
Inquiry
Several Devil's
Advocates repre-
senting different
interest groups.
Use of Custodian
and Magistrate.
Explicit attempt
to identify assump-
tions underlying
favored plan.
Development of
counter assump-
tions as basis
for counterplan.
Alexander George
Presidential Decision-
Making
Richard Mason and
Ian Mitroff
Challenging Strategic
Planning Assumptions
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